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Naive Love and Mature Art 
-  Two Consistent Testimonies. 
A Study on the Philosophy of Life
Introduction
There is no doubt that man has always been accompanied by 
art. Doubts are raised only when we ask what man needs art for. This 
question is usually accompanied by a derivative question -  what kind of 
art does man need? Answers to this last one are given by three groups 
of people: (1) receivers, (2) more or less moralizing philosophers, theo­
rists and art critics, and finally (3) artists themselves, who created and 
still create art. Receivers give the answer with their ‘legs’ -  they always 
consociate with certain works of art, with others rarely, and still others 
they try to eliminate as efficiently as possible from their memory. The 
more or less moralizing philosophers, theorists and art critics either 
have the courage to learn from artists and follow them or they them­
selves try to point at the best ways of development for creative artists. 
It happens that these two strategies coincide with one another. The 
present essay is the modest attempt of a more or less moralizing phi­
losopher, theorist and art critic to sketch an answer to the immodest 
question: what is art for?
We sometimes hear the opinion that art soothes the savage breast. 
Many events from the history of mankind point to the fact that art 
soothes the savage breast only in the heads of philosophers and aestheti- 
cians who are in love with it. However, when we leave the world of their 
utopian hopes, it appears that art at least complicates the urgings of the 
savage breast. This is proved, among others, by the fate of the protago­
nists of a story from which at least a couple of springs of European cul­
ture flow. It is an important adventure, since it allows us to take a fresh 
look at ethical dilemmas which are shared by all those communities 
which still have the courage to declare their faith in the power of democ­
racy. These are the dilemmas and dreams of Odysseus, who, in order to 
survive, must succeed in avoiding the island inhabited by the Sirens. Up 
to this point, every mortal who has heard the beauty of their singing has 
been doomed to die. Odysseus will be the first mortal who manages not 
only to listen to the beauty of this singing but also -  in spite of this -  to 
save his own life. But even then nothing is for free, for it turns out that 
many people must pay a tremendous price for the fact that Odysseus de­
cided to listen to the beauty of the Sirens’ singing. Not only did he seal 
up the ears of his travel companions with wax, but what is more he for­
bade them to obey all of the commands which soon he would be issuing 
in a state of melodious ravishment. And so it transpired. The more dis­
tinctly Odysseus hears the Sirens, the more assertively he commands 
his friends to free him. However, they have their ears filled with wax 
and thus are not affected by the beauty of the singing; they approach 
him only to tie him more tightly. It may seem that the story ended suc­
cessfully -  both he who heard the singing and those who were forced to 
be deaf to its beauty survived. Shakespeare once wrote that someone 
must watch so another may sleep. Odysseus could admire the Sirens’ 
singing only because he found people ready not to hear it. Art does not 
like democracy. Odysseus can relish beauty only because there are peo­
ple who will not. This is the first price paid by Odysseus’ friends. There 
is still another price connected with his antinomic order: ‘Heed not my 
orders as long as I am under the influence of beauty’. This command 
stirs an ‘axiological’ earthquake in their heads. Hitherto they had been 
living in a world of simple rules which were as plain as death; namely, 
they knew that if they wanted to survive they had to be boundlessly 
obedient to Odysseus. This time they learn that they are not to be obe­
dient.
Presumably, therefore, not without reason is the encounter with the 
Sirens the penultimate story that the protagonists of the Odyssey experi­
ence together. The last story will take place on the island where the god 
Helios tends his herd. Odysseus categorically forbids anyone to hunt the 
divine animals. This order, however, is heard by different people -  differ­
ent because their heads still retain the memory of their recent legal dis­
obedience. Now they are people convinced that there will possibly be 
moments when they will be allowed to be, or will even have to be, disobe­
dient to him. For this reason they hunt the divine animals; for this rea­
son they do not starve to death; but they are destroyed by the gods. Only 
Odysseus will survive. His need for contact with beauty could only be met 
at the cost of an overhasty lesson in democracy for his companions, who 
were not yet ready for it.
1. How was it once?
In respect to antiquity it is hard to talk about an alliance of 
philosophers and artists. On the one hand, Plato himself praised beauty. 
He said that it was a difficult thing, although on the other hand he had 
no doubt that the beauty created by artists actually draws us away from 
the truth and not closer to it. For Plato, truly beautiful is that which ex­
ists, and that which truly exists, for Plato, is only being. An artist who 
paints a picture of the shadow of an idea actually opposes the philosophi­
cal mission of coming out of the cave. Artists, by embellishing the world, 
prove that it is somehow possible to live in the cave, and thus they keep 
us inside.
It can be presumed that Plato was driven by envy. He was searching 
for a place for philosophy both in the human soul and in contemporary 
social life. Philosophy is younger than art; it is also younger than religion 
and literature and the fame of warriors. Younger though it is, it claims to 
have the proverbial rule over human hearts. Philosophy guaranteed peo­
ple certain immortality. Plato, meanwhile, knew that art also had some­
thing to offer to people -  that same immortality. However, as we know, 
when two huge powers enjoy almost the same place in the human soul, 
friendship between them is impossible. The relationship between phi­
losophy and art is too big not to raise anxiety about the future of the 
commonly inherited legacy from the human hope for immortality. The 
things that are discussed by a philosopher, are done by a warrior and 
shown by an artist. Plato will more readily admit that the fame of a war­
rior can be a legal form of human care for immortality, alternative to 
that of philosophy.
In the culture of the Christian Middle Ages, the situation of art was 
also initially ambiguous. After all, Christian redemption is fed with God’s 
love and good deeds, the need for which is born in man of this love. It 
comes as no surprise, then, that the attitude of theologians to art was 
less than straightforward. They admired the beauty of the world, since it 
was a divine work. However, they often saw a germ of evil in art. Saint 
Jerome (347-420) asserted that he would not let others induce him to 
admit painters, as well as sculptors and stone-cutters and other servants 
of debauchery, to the liberal arts. What patterns of weavers could equal 
flowers?1 asked this venerable man, who, thanks to this nature-friendly 
remark, deserves the title of patron of ecologists. Saint Jerome knew that 
the beauty created by man was superficial; he also knew, however, that
1 See Władysław Tatarkiewicz, History of Aesthetics, vol. 2 (London 1999).
although it is superficial, or perhaps for this very reason, it diverts man 
from the contemplation of the truth of divine beauty. Saint Bernard, liv­
ing seven hundred years later, also condemned art. He asked what that 
ridiculous monstrosity, strange shapelessness and shapely shapelessness 
was doing in monasteries, in the presence of the reading brothers. 
Moreover, what were unclean monkeys, wild lions, dreadful centaurs, 
half-people, striped tigers, fighting soldiers or hunters blowing their 
horns doing there? One could see many corpses with one head and vice 
versa -  many heads on one body. Here was a serpent’s tail on a quadru­
ped, there a quadruped’s head on a fish. A beast was pretending to be a 
horse on one side and dragging half a goat at the back, and here again a 
horned animal was displaying a horse’s rump. Bernard foretells that 
since such a vast and strange variety of different shapes looks out from 
all sides, people will prefer looking at embellishments, dealing with them 
for the whole day and admiring them one after another, than contem­
plating God’s law.2 Bernard warns against art since, similarly to the 
momentary charm of life, it makes people forget what is really important. 
The shapely shapelessness of art has a venom that can even kill: a 
healthy life avoids shapelessness, it feels well among shapely forms -  on- 
tologically defined, visually symmetrical and stable, since only these can 
be touched, grasped and -  most importantly -  captured in a notion; 
meanwhile, in the world of art even shapelessness is shapely, that is, al­
luring, tempting and thus worthy of sin.
However, it was yet another option that won the day. It is well illus­
trated by a statement made by Suger (1081-1151), abbot of Saint-Denis, 
arbiter of taste and art lover. The abbot admits that when, out of pure 
rapture at the beauty of God’s house, the multicoloured handsomeness of 
precious stones diverted him occasionally from the worries of the exter­
nal world, and the noble meditation that transported him from material 
to immaterial things induced him to contemplate the multitude of sacred 
virtues [...] it seemed to him then that he could see that he was carried to 
some area outside the earthly world, which was neither fully immersed 
in the earthly mire nor in the purity of heaven and he understood that 
with God’s help one could move from the lower to the higher world.3 
Elsewhere, Suger suggests that everyone should behave as he or she sees 
fit. He finds it proper that the most precious things should be used in 
celebration of the Holy Eucharist. If, according to God’s word and the 
Prophet’s command, they collected the blood of goats, calves and a red 
heifer into golden chalices, golden flasks and small mortars of gold, so
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
much more should people use dishes made of gold, gemstones and all 
things perceived among creatures as precious when they are to drink 
from them the blood of Jesus Christ. Suger’s critics state that a holiness 
of soul, purity of thoughts and faithfulness of intentions is sufficient sac­
rifice. Suger agrees that these things do indeed count first and foremost. 
However, he also states that the external ornaments of sacred dishes also 
belong to service, and first of all to the service of the Holy Sacrifice, 
which should be performed in complete internal chastity and complete 
external nobility.4 It turns out that aesthetical contemplation transports 
man from the lower to the higher world. Art liberates us from our onto­
logical, cognitive and axiological habits connected with the world. Thanks 
to art we can look at the world in a different way -  it loses its monopoly 
on mothering, not only the real truth, but, with the passing of time, even 
any truth that is less real.
We know very well that from the economic point of view a kilogram of 
gold is more valuable than a kilogram of iron. It is different on a battle­
field: the man who fights with a golden sword will probably lose to one 
who holds an iron sword. It is similar in the world of art: a golden statu­
ette often means infinitely less than a figurine made of iron, bronze or 
even clay. From the physical point of view, a twenty-kilo-painting weighs 
more than a one-kilo one. However, when we place the two paintings on 
the scales of art, it is the lighter one that often seems to prevail. A por­
trait of an ugly woman (if such a woman exists) can be more beautiful 
than a portrait of the most beautiful woman in the world. Art likes to 
cock a snook at the world -  showing it that its settled ways and habits do 
not have to be the final word and do not have to bind man in every aspect 
of life. The artistic consent to breaking natural proportions renders them 
‘so-called’ natural proportions: thus a man can be bigger than the city 
walls in front of which he stands.
For Bernard, art can only draw a human being ‘down’; for Suger, on 
the contrary, art forces people to abandon -  if only for a while -  what is 
low and even more low. Neither of them initiated this discussion, nor did 
they finish it. Maybe some day it will turn out that the question about 
art is older by a brainwave than art itself. We encounter still today the 
spiritual descendants of both Bernard and Suger. From time to time we 
learn, for example, that an image -  an image in the very broad sense, so 
broad that its notion encompasses everything that belongs to contempo­
rary art or, depending on your view, to contemporary artistic culture -  
can still hurt feelings, offend, upset, vilify objective values and demoral­
4 See Georges Duby, The Age of the Cathedrals: Art and Society, 980 -  1420, 
trans. Eleanor Levieux and Barbara Thompson (Chicago, 1981).
ize. As can be seen, although the work of art has long ceased parading in 
a mask of classical realizations, it is rarely toothless; thus it still bites, 
stings and mistreats not only physically, but also spiritually.
With the passing of time, not only did the Church become reconciled 
with art, it even fell in love with it. Art knew how to seduce the ecclesias­
tic potentates of the world. Since they could not desire the world directly, 
it was through the medium of art that they made love to it or expressed 
their love and at the same time their sinful dreams in a morally abso­
lutely legal and impeccable way. The virtual unreality of art more and 
more often appeared more real than the world, the natural momentari­
ness of which art -  and probably only art -  had the courage to counter 
with its own artificial eternity. The alliance of religion and art becomes a 
fact. Art -  this impressive Biblia pauperum -  becomes a common me­
dium in the axiological education of society. The art of images appears to 
be more legible than the art of writing. The situation of the mediaeval 
work of art was fabulous, since its desire to be a seen work of art was 
thoroughly fulfilled. The culture of religious art satisfied this natural 
need of each work of art, which, exposed in a temple, often as part of an 
altar, was always located in the most crucial part of the contemporary 
religious world. After all, it was the temple that symbolized the loftiest, 
or maybe even the only, values of life at that time. It was obvious that 
whoever wanted to guarantee eternal life for himself had to visit a tem­
ple. And if he visited a temple, he had to watch and contemplate the 
works of art that were there, whether he liked it or not. Surrounded by 
living values, a work of mediaeval art could do nothing but live; it was 
even in a better situation than today’s visual advertisements emitted 
during television programmes (or directly before or after them), which 
enjoy the biggest viewing ratings. A television spectator holds a remote 
control in his hand; a member of the mediaeval community was deprived 
of the privilege of deciding (and thus of eliminating).
To sum up: art was in a good state. It is, however, the nature of not 
only people but also art that, when it is in a good state, the desire is to 
make it even better. But this time as well it will turn out that ‘better’ is 
the enemy of ‘good’. The modern condition of art is vivid proof of this 
truth. Modern art had to cope with at least two challenges.
2. How was it somewhat later?
The first challenge was laid down by the Reformation, which 
wanted to be a return to the culture of the word. The great Reformers 
defined the love between mediaeval religion and art as debauched. Espe­
cially principled was the Reformation theologian Andreas Bodenstein, 
known as Karlstadt (1480-1541):
Images are dumb and deaf; they neither see, nor hear; they cannot learn any­
thing, nor can they teach; and the only thing they bring closer is the ordinary 
body, which serves no purpose. Consequently, they serve no purpose as well. 
God’s word, however, is spiritual, and only it can help the faithful. Therefore, it is 
untrue that images are the books of simple people, for simple people cannot learn 
redemption, nor derive anything that serves redemption or Christian life from an 
image.5
Karlstadt wanted to live in a world free from images. His drama was 
rooted not in the fact that he did not love images, but in the fact that he 
hated them. Man is enslaved not only by what he loves, but also by what 
fuels his hatred and fear. Hatred is a passion as great as love. Although 
they are certainly of a different hue one from the other, they also come 
together in a mutual need of expression which they cannot control. Love 
lives so long as it creates life, hatred -  so long as it destroys it. Karlstadt 
admits:
Ever since my childhood, my heart has been raised and has grown in the spirit of 
worshipping images and respect for them, and because of that it is filled with 
harmful fear, of which I would willingly rid myself, but cannot. Thus, I live in the 
apprehension that I must not burn any oil idols. I am afraid that the devilish 
jester might jump on my back. Although, on the one hand, I have the Holy Bible 
and I know that images can do nothing, that they do not have life, blood or spirit, 
on the other hand, I am gripped by fear and I am still afraid of the painted devil. 
[...] Images are the cause of the fall of man, they are a gallows trap set for him 
and the reason for his misfortunes.6
Unlike Karlstadt, Martin Luther (1483-1546) was not a slave to im­
ages in the negative sense. He neither loved nor hated them. As a result, 
he writes about images calmly, without getting overly heated:
It is characteristic of images that they are not inevitable but optional; we can ei­
ther have them or not, although it would be better if we did not have them at all.
I myself am not fond of them. Images should be abolished only in the case of their 
being worshipped, not otherwise; however, I would rather they did not exist any­
where in the world, for the reason... of the bad use to which they are put. 
Namely, when someone places an image in a church, it seems to him that it is an 
act of kindness to God, but in fact it is pure idolatry. [...] One would do better to 
give a golden gulden to a poor man than a golden image to God.
5 Teoretycy, pisarze i artyści o sztuce. 1500-1600 [Theorists, writers and artists on 
art. 1500-1600], ed. Jan Białostocki (Warsaw, 1985), 114-116 (translation -  R.K.).
6 Ibid., 119.
Nonetheless, Luther does accept certain images:
Images on which one can see various past stories and things as in a mirror, are 
images-reflections, and these we do not reject. Only those images are idols in which 
man trusts, not the images which are commemorative signs on coins. [...] An image 
on the wall, which I see, not connecting it with idolatrous superstitions, is not for­
bidden, otherwise mirrors would have to be forbidden and children’s toys as well.'
It is poor consolation for art that it can endure only as long as it 
draws its patterns of existence from children’s toys and lifeless mirrors.
The second challenge was connected with the autonomization of art, 
which took place in a society placing its trust increasingly -  sometimes 
instinctively, sometimes consciously -  in democratic strategies of life. 
Artists do not want to have any spiritual authorities over themselves to 
tell them what to deal with and what not, how to do something, whether 
to paint over something or not. In particular, they want their works of 
art to be seen not just during church services. The eighteenth century 
sees the erection of the first temples of art -  museums and galleries, rep­
resenting an alternative to the religious temples existing up to now. 
Freedom costs. Believers know why they are to attend religious temples. 
A man of the modern era -  more accurately, a modern man -  must be 
convinced that he must (also) visit the temple of art. In 1750 the German 
philosopher Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten publishes a work entitled 
Aesthetica, where for the first time the word ‘aesthetics’ means the sci­
ence of the beauty of human works or, in other words, the science of art. 
On the one hand, temples of art are erected; on the other hand, treatises 
are published that prove its necessity. Art, which in the Middle Ages ex­
plained and validated what was important and made the mysterious com­
prehensible, suddenly becomes difficult art, which requires explanation, 
commentary and -  most crucially -  validation. No surprise, then, that 
philosophers look more closely at art, which is craving a sort of self- 
knowledge. Bernard Shaw once said that only an ill man knows he has 
bones. Meanwhile, modern society learns that it has art. Together with 
this self-knowledge, questions arise which were hitherto not known by art: 
what is art for? What is art? Is it not so, that he who answers these ques­
tions is excusing art for something to something or someone? After all, 
someone who fully identifies with his own existence does not ask himself 
and the world such questions. Did the first crisis of God in European cul­
ture not appear together with the proofs of His existence elaborated by 
mediaeval philosophers and theologians? A beloved God needs no such 
proofs, for anyone who loves has no doubt that the object of his love exists.
(Modern) art begins to be accompanied by more and more proofs of 
this sort, which indicate and describe not only its existence, but also any 
possible -  that is, metaphysical, epistemological, existential, axiological, 
ethical, social, political, etc. -  usefulness of this existence. It turns out 
that art is useful for many reasons. Here are some of them.
Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1749-1832) was convinced that all 
the arts had a double aim: ‘to evoke pleasure and at the same time to 
teach. An artist’s paintbrush should be saturated with reason[...] it 
should make one think more than can what catches the eye alone.’8 The 
English aesthetician Joseph Addison (1672-1719) thought similarly over 
fifty years earlier:
The delights of the imagination, in their full sense, are neither as coarse as the 
delights of the senses, nor as subtle as the delights of human reason. The man of 
a well formed imagination is admitted to many pleasures which unrefined people 
cannot feel. He can carry on a conversation with an image and find a pleasant 
companion in a statue. Not only is art a source of pleasure, but moreover the 
ability to feel these pleasures allows us to distinguish cultural people from vulgar 
brutes. Art also teaches us to look at nature as at a source of pleasure. Although 
there are many paintings of nature in its primordial state which are more 
charming than anything that can be displayed by art, the more that works of na­
ture resemble works of art the more pleasant they seem to be to us.9
This linking of art with the sphere of pleasant sensations is worthy of 
attention. Thanks to the hedonistic aesthetic, pleasure ceases to be the 
poor sister of the so-called main values, on which every concept of decent 
living has hitherto been based. It was necessary to somehow smuggle 
aesthetic -  and thus sensual -  pleasure into the ethically legal parlours 
of socially transparent life. It should be noted that the social condition of 
the pleasant life was always poor. Only people of mean spirit lived in a 
pleasant way, whereas true people -  philosophers, knights, saints -  
avoided pleasures. Delight does not serve thinking well; it softens the 
fighting spirit and diverts from the truth of eschatological mystery. The 
rule was this: the less pleasure, the more humanity. In particular, the 
feudal society was warned against the devilish power of sensual plea­
sures, since it is the need to experience them that is the most faithful 
companion of every man. A serf must be a man who lives with a perpet­
ual feeling of his own guilt and sinfulness. Anyone who lived in the feu­
dal world had to have a guilty mind, had to be convinced that he was an 
‘eternal’ sinner, since only then were the authorities sure that he would 
be obedient. In the feudal system, the serf did not have to, and was not
8 Ibid, 198.
9 Ibid, 36-39.
supposed to, worry about the things that were happening ‘on high’, since 
the authorities of the day always dealt very well with the need to produce 
their successors. In other words, they reproduced themselves. In the con­
temporary stage of modern times it is different, since the authorities no 
longer reproduce themselves, but rather constitute themselves by the act 
of election. The serfs of yesterday have to feel themselves worthy of par­
ticipating in such elections. They need a feeling of their own worth, as 
only this feeling is able to bestow on them the dignity of the subject of a 
democratic society. No surprise, therefore, that the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment underline the magnitude and dignity of each man. In his 
consecutive images, the guilt decreases and the feeling of importance in­
creases. Man creates himself in the image and likeness of humanity, for 
which he must be responsible. Although still they have no unconditional 
access to the pleasures of the body, people can legally experience the aes­
thetic delights offered by works of art. Although people were not allowed 
to live in a pleasant way, they always liked and wished to live in a pleas­
ant way. Therefore, modern times had to give some right to experience 
pleasure, and they gave it by means of art. When a modern man admires 
in a legal and official way the body of a naked woman, he is a lecher, a 
sinner, a hideous man, barred from any society salons; but when the 
same man admires a painting of a beautiful naked body of the same 
woman, he appears to be an aesthetical, educated, sensitive man, who 
can be, should be, and is worth being, allowed into the salons. As such, 
art is a specific way of ethicising pleasure. We cannot yet taste life and 
the world. We can, however, taste images of the world and images of life. 
Consequently, commenting on Kant’s aesthetics, Hegel comes to the con­
clusion that thought in aesthetic beauty is something materialized, and 
that matter is not defined by it externally but possesses its own free exis­
tence. The natural, sensual, emotional factor has its measure, purpose 
and consistence in itself; however, inspection and sentiment scale the 
heights of spiritual generality, insofar as the thought not only renounces 
its hostility towards nature but actually takes delight in it. Conse­
quently, emotion, pleasure and delight become legal and sanctified.10 
Therefore, although we live in a pleasant way, we live without the feeling 
of guilt.
Kant himself stresses that fine art and the sciences which, thanks to 
the generally spreading pleasure, and to good manners and politeness, 
make man, if not aesthetically better, at least civilized, restrain, to a 
large extent, the tyranny of sensual desires and prepare man for rule
10 See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Arts, trans. 
T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1988), 103.
where the power should be held by reason alone. Meanwhile, the misfor­
tunes which are inflicted on people either by nature or by disagreeable 
human egoism, mobilize, augment and harden the strength of the human 
soul, such that we might not yield to these inclinations. In this way they 
allow us to feel a certain fitness concealed within us for higher aims.11 
Kant does not share the sublime, and thus also naive, optimism of the 
ancient philosophers, who were convinced of the trinity of the principal 
values of beauty, truth and goodness; yet at the same time there is no 
doubt that art, alongside science, is a power that effectively civilizes the 
sensual nature of man. The aspiration to limiting the tyranny of sensual 
desires does not have to equate to an instruction to eliminate the desires 
themselves: just as long as they are good, as long as their power -  surely 
indispensable -  does not assume the shape of tyranny. Kant’s philosophy 
sketches a personality which breathes best in the company of democratic 
ideals. Art brings us closer to these ideals. Unsurprisingly, therefore, it is 
decorous to receive an aesthetic education. An artistic education is be­
coming a vital part of every form of education for those who are supposed 
to belong in the future to the social elites.
Also such thinkers as Schelling, Goethe, Schiller and the less known 
Wackenroden held great expectations for art. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 
Schelling (1775-1854) was probably the first philosopher to acknowledge 
that cognition by means of art is more perfect and fuller than that which 
takes place in philosophical thought. In Plato, art kept man in the cave; 
with Schelling, not only does it take man out of the cave, but it also takes 
him out whole, and not only -  as Plato suggested for the philosophising 
man -  in part, and essentially wounded. In the world of Plato, only he 
will see the light of truth who can admire it with closed eyes; with Schel­
ling, one can, and indeed must, have one’s eyes wide open. The work of 
art is a product of inspection, which borders, on the one hand, on the 
product of nature and, on the other, on the product of freedom. At the 
same time, Schelling dissociates himself from hedonistic aesthetics. For 
him, the holiness and purity of art results from this independence from 
external aims. It actually goes so far that it not only excludes an affinity 
with everything that is only sensual pleasure -  the requiring of which 
from art is sheer barbarity -  or with utility, which can be required from 
art only by an epoch that directs all its highest efforts of spirit to eco­
nomic inventiveness, but also confronts science, which is a manufactory 
craft, with art, which is either the privilege of genius or else does not ex­
ist. In his opinion, there are no geniuses in the sciences, not in the sense
11 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, trans. Eric Matthews 
(Cambridge, 2001), 427-428.
that it would be impossible to solve some problem through genius, but 
because the same problem which can be solved by genius, can also be 
solved mechanically. He adds that what art creates is possible only and 
exclusively thanks to genius, since there is an infinite contradiction in 
every task performed by art. The results of a science c a n be obtained 
thanks to genius, but need not be.12 Although it was the brilliant Ein­
stein who constructed the theory of relativity, if we believe Schelling, 
sooner or later such a theory could be constructed by some group of tal­
ented, but not necessarily brilliant, scientists. In other words, the genius 
of a scientist is replaceable by the effort of a certain community of non­
geniuses.13 However, a work by a brilliant artist is in a different situa­
tion. If ‘this something’ was painted by Van Gogh, even if a thousand 
artists -  ‘bit by bit by bit’; and in art a ‘bit’ is an ocean -  less brilliant 
than Van Gogh, that is, artists without genius, started to paint sunflow­
ers, then sooner or later, all of them, contrary to Van Gogh’s Sunflowers, 
would wilt. Schelling also praises art for having skills which will be 
never achieved by man in other fields of culture. For him, a piece of art 
reflects that which cannot be reflected in anything else, that absolute 
identity which becomes divided even in the I. Thus, what a philosopher 
divides in the first act of consciousness and what is inaccessible to any 
other inspection, radiates from works of art by the power of a miracle. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that art is the highest value for a philoso­
pher, since it opens up for him, as it were, the holiest sanctuary, where 
what has become divided in nature and history and what must eternally 
escape itself in life and activity, just as in thinking, burns with one flame 
in an eternal and primordial embrace.14 Contrary to Plato, it is the expe­
rience of art and not philosophical experience that enables man to thor­
oughly liberate himself from all the limitations and illusions due to 
which he remains a being that drifts beside the truth. Schelling states 
that the insight into nature which a philosopher must achieve artifi­
cially, is primeval and natural in art. What we call nature is a poem 
coded in esoteric and wondrous writing. However, he also adds that if we 
penetrated this riddle, we would recognize the odyssey of spirit in it,
12 See Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, The System of Transcendental Ideal­
ism, trans. Peter Heath (University Press of Virginia, 1993), 369-370.
13 I permit myself to note that in their treatment of science and scholarship, the 
policies of the European Union generally follow Schelling’s reasoning. According to 
these policies a scientist or scholar is important as long as he is tied to some grant, 
and thus functions within a particular scientific or scholarly community. Anyone 
working individually is perceived as an oddball, and no-one will treat him seriously in 
Brussels or, slowly, here in Warsaw, too.
14 Schelling, The System of Transcendental Idealism, 369-370.
which, driven by wondrous illusions and searching for itself, escapes it­
self. This is because sense comes through the sensual world only as 
through words, as through the semi-opaque mist of the world of fantasy, 
where we would like to arrive. Every wonderful painting is created to 
some extent by nudging back the invisible barrier that divides the real 
and the ideal world, and it is only an opening through which those forms 
of the areas of the fantasy world which through the real world only 
glimmer, appear in their fullness. Thus, according to Schelling, nature is 
for an artist, as well as for a philosopher, only an ideal world appearing 
in conditions of a constant limitation, or else just an imperfect reflection 
of the world which exists not outside it but inside it. Absolute objective­
ness is given only to art. If art was deprived of objectiveness, it would 
cease to be what it is, and it would change into philosophy. If philosophy 
was given objectiveness, it would cease to be philosophy and would be­
come art. Philosophy achieves what is the highest, yet it takes there only 
a part of man, as it were.15 From the philosophical perspective, man 
comes out of the Platonic cave only thanks to his thoughts, to which he 
succeeded in imparting the shapeless shape of appropriate notions.
This amazing statement by the philosopher, who says that philosophy 
is a worse form of truth-seeking than art, is amazing only for philoso­
phers. Artists accept it with understanding. A philosopher seeking the 
truth of the world must ‘depart’ it, deprive it of materiality, that is, re­
duce it to notions. A philosopher seeking, for example, the truth of a chair, 
which one experiences with the senses, changes it instantly into a notion, 
which -  like a ghost -  eludes all the senses, whereas an artist, as Schel­
ling points out, seeking the essence of a chair does not deprive it of its 
sensuality, but, through a work of art, finds such an aesthetical form of it 
which contains, as does the notion of a chair, all the chairs in the world. 
According to the Platonic prescription, one must close one’s eyes to come 
out of the cave; in the world of art, one must have them wide open all the 
time. The Platonic man who comes out of the cave is a ghost, since he 
does hot possess a body, or at least it seems to him that he has managed 
to liberate himself from the expectations of his body. Through philoso­
phy, the cave is exited only by those thoughts which managed to congeal 
into the form of notions, whereas bodies remain in it permanently; 
through art, the ‘whole’ man -  not only his thoughts, but also his senses
-  comes out of the cave. Only when we see the things that are individual 
and unique in a work of art can we see the generality that mothers this 
individuality and uniqueness. The object of philosophical love is human­
ity, and that is why philosophy -  excluding its pre-postmodernistic,
postmodernistic and modernistic, or in short, nominalistic degenerations
-  does not know what to do with the love of specific people; the love 
which objectifies itself on the bed of art, fulfils itself thanks to specific 
people. So again, art has something in it which is not possessed by any 
other field of culture -  neither science, nor philosophy. According to 
Schelling, art takes the whole man, as he is, into the spheres where he 
can recognize what is supreme, and this is its eternal distinguishing fea­
ture and its miracle.16 For Hegel, let’s remember, art was also a form of 
absolute spirit, a source of the power thanks to which a subjective entity 
recognized its absoluteness and as such became a fully real being. How­
ever, Hegel also remained faithful to the Platonic tradition which de­
scribes the highest form of the realisation of the human spirit in philoso­
phy.
Among those who were convinced that art could do a great deal of 
good was Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805): ‘Beauty alone confers happiness 
on all, and under its influence every being forgets that he is limited. 
Taste does not suffer any superior or absolute authority, and the sway of 
beauty is extended over appearance.’17 The great Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe (1749-1832) also lavishes superlatives on art:
When art at last, by imitating nature, by attempting to create for itself a general 
language, by a precise and profound study of mere objects, comes to a more pre­
cise cognition of the qualities of things and the way in which they exist and is 
able to distinguish various characteristic forms from a row of shapes and repro­
duce them -  then it will reach the highest possible step, that is, style. On this 
step, art can compare itself with the loftiest aspirations of man. Just as simple 
imitation is based on calm existence and intimate presence, and mannerism em­
braces phenomena with a light and clever mind, so style rests on the deepest 
foundations of cognition, on the essence of things, as long as it can be recognised 
in visible and perceptible shapes.18
For Goethe, the highest form in which art exists is style, since style 
leads to the most precise cognition of the properties of things. The cogni­
tive value of art situates it higher than science, which at this time in its 
different fields -  especially in physics -  is approaching a methodological 
breakthrough, shortly to reach the axiomatic stage. Modern science 
thinks about the world in a quantitative way; art remains faithful to its 
qualitative approach. Goethe’s declaration can be considered as an ambi-
16 Ibid, 380.
17 J. C. Friedrich von Schiller, ‘Letters upon the Aesthetic Education of Man’, in 
Literary and Philosophical Essays, xxxii, The Harvard Classics (New York, 1909-14); 
Bartleby.com, 2001, www.bartleby.com/32/527.html.
18 Teoretycy, artyści i krytycy o sztuce [Theorists, artists and critics on art] ed. El­
żbieta Grabska and Maria Poprzęcka, (Warsaw, 1974), 224-225.
tious attempt to save the former ways of problematizing the world, which 
are increasingly often superseded by scientific conceptualizations.
Modern art searches for its place in a world which, thanks to science, 
is undergoing secularisation, as broadly understood. The philosophical 
name for this process is Cartesian dualism. God is absent from both the 
physical world (thanks to Newton) and the natural world (thanks to 
Darwin). To explain the facts found in them, we refer only to the notions 
of particular sciences. There also appear the first attempts to secularise 
problems of the human spirit. More and more often, man is located 
within the boundaries of the culture that forms him, the notion of which 
expresses the secularised form of modern man’s self-knowledge. For in­
stance, Kant builds ethics in which the source of moral law is not ‘stone 
tablets’, however we understand them, but man himself (‘The starry 
heavens above me and the moral law within me’). God is farther and far­
ther away. This does not mean, however, that the need for transcen­
dence, which has hitherto been the main factor organizing human spiri­
tuality, withdraws together with Him. And again it is art that turns out 
to be useful, since its aesthetic temples prove to be a place in which 
traces of transcendence are still stored. Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder 
(1773-1798) describes this hope beautifully:
Art can be called a flower of human feelings. The Father of All Things, in each 
work of art, in all parts of the world, notices the trace of a heavenly spark, which, 
having come from him, has penetrated the heart of man and materialised itself 
into his small works [...] He likes the Gothic temple as much as the Greek one, 
and the barbarous war music of savages sounds to him as nicely as tutored choirs 
and church singing.19
In the world of art, the ‘true’ Christian temples are equated with the 
‘false’ pagan temples. Art has, after all, its own criterion of truth, which 
is superior to the alternative criteria, of religion, science and life. Wacken­
roder describes the temples of art by means of terms which have formerly 
appeared in discourses serving the problematization of the religious 
sphere of life:
Picture galleries are treated as fairs, where new goods are casually evaluated, 
praised and derided. In his opinion, however, these should be temples, where, 
in invigorating solitude, man would admire, in calm and silent humility, 
prominent artists, those most perfect among earthly creatures, and immersed 
in long, unbroken contemplation of their works, one would warm oneself in the 
glow of entrancing thoughts and emotions. For me, revelling in a work of art is 
similar to a prayer.[...] An ignoble offence is committed by he who, amidst the
hum of an earthly hour, drunk with the loud laughter of friends, enters a 
nearby church. [...] A similar offence is to cross at such an hour the threshold 
of a house in which the worthiest works of the human hand are kept for all 
times -  a silent testimony to the dignity of the human tribe. Wait, as in a 
prayer, for blessed hours, in which the mercy of the Heavens will enlighten you 
with a revelation of loftier things; only then will your soul unite in one with the 
works of artists. [...] Works of art, by their nature, similarly to a thought about 
God, are not compatible with the daily race of life. [...] Only the peace and con­
centration of the spirit allow one to taste the real delight which expresses itself 
neither in cries nor in applause, but in the stirring of the soul. For me, sacred is 
the day when -  spiritually prepared, with dignity -  I set out to look at noble 
works of art.20
For Wackenroder, art is the highest form of human spirituality. The 
modern artist replaces the mediaeval priest and saint:
Do not dare to elevate yourself over the spirit of great artists with impertinent 
courage and to judge them in advance, since this is the unreasonable intention of 
vain human pride. Art stands above man: we can only admire, worship and open 
our hearts before the excellent works of its priests to obtain liberation and the puri­
fication of all our feelings.21
All these programmes of ‘saving art’ arose around the turn of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Their common aim was to demon­
strate the existential and social usefulness of art which severed the um­
bilical cord that had hitherto tied it to religious values. Art was reani­
mated in many ways. It proved to be the source of a credible and full 
cognition of the things that created the world of our lives; it showed peo­
ple the dimension of absolute existence and no less absolute identity; in a 
legal way it delivered sensual pleasures; finally, it allowed civilized peo­
ple to be distinguished from the commonalty. As a result, everyone who 
came into contact with a work of art became a human being who had the 
right to sense his or her own self worth and as such could be an active 
subject of a democratic society. Beautiful art -  if we are to believe the 
aestheticians -  raised man to live in a world not only of beauty, but also 
of truth and good.
20 Ibid, 116.
21 Ibid, 235-238. Wackenroder also spares no criticism of contemporary art: Woe 
betide our age, which treats art as a frivolous trifle of the senses, since it is really 
something very important and lofty. Is man no longer respected, that he is neglected 
in art, and nice colours and all tricks of light are deemed more worthy of his atten­
tion? (See p. 240) (translation mine). 150 years later these words would be repeated, 
among others, by Hans Sedlmayr, in his Verlust der Mitte. However, Sedlmayer de­
nies art the right to impose its own aesthetic criterion of truth on other domains of 
the human spirit.
Conclusion
Everyone must die. Perhaps the history of mankind began 
when man realized that not only was he unable, but he also did not wish, 
to reconcile himself to his mortality. Since the very first moments of 
mankind, the refusal to accept the passage of time has been expressed in 
searching for various ways of enduring, including after death. Culture 
has long been competing with biology in these endeavours. At some point 
in his spiritual development, man, or more accurately a man, realized 
that the little people moving around the female were not only hers, but 
also his children. Although it is not certain that in the history of the hu­
man race this discovery was comparable with the gesture of Eve, who 
reached for the fruit of knowledge a little earlier, there is also no doubt 
that the history of the world would have unfolded differently had men 
remained in their blissful unawareness of this matter to the present day. 
Henceforth, striving to monopolize the favours of the female, he took care 
over the fate of both his sensual desires and his genes. Every instance of 
love is an ambitious attempt to translate these operations -  for at least 
two hundred years undertaken by women also -  into the language of aes­
thetic laws and obligations. St Augustine’s maxim ‘Love and do as you 
will’, which formerly concerned the intimate relations between man and 
God, nowadays appears to be a dictum which most aptly summarizes the 
key canons of modern sexual culture.
The majority of religions guarantee man’s duration after the death of 
his essence, which is most often defined as ‘soul’. Art, for its part, either 
tried to provide similar guarantees of ‘life after death’ or else just sup­
ported the two ways of finding them -  the biological and the religious -  
referred to above. In the first case, art guaranteed immortality only for 
artists, since it was the memory of their works that was greater than 
their life. Since there are always fewer artists than men who are not 
artists, more interesting and much more important is the second case, 
where art becomes an ally of the religion or earthly life of each of us. 
Above all, art backs earthly life when it supports the love of which each 
and every life is born. In 1908 Adolf Loos, the prominent Viennese archi­
tect and art theoretician, observed that ‘all art is erotic’. It is hard not to 
agree with him. If eroticism is what we call the care taken to make the 
lust for life always find an adequate aesthetic expression in life, art has 
always been boundlessly faithful to this care. Art has always accompa­
nied man in his most important affairs and moments; it has taught him 
to express and understand himself, to ask about life and death, to ac­
knowledge the hunger for truth and love, to guard against the unbear­
able ubiquitousness of hatred and jealousy. All these emotions and values
are part of the condition of human fate; they are important when present 
in life, as well as when we painfully experience their lack. All of them are 
as old as man, and they have been changing together with him to this 
very day; thus can it occur that they play a leading role in life, although 
it also happens that they must be able to fulfil themselves in episodes 
and parts.
The case of eroticism and art is not different. Neither eroticism nor 
art avoids paradoxes. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the history 
of eroticism, and thus the history of eroticism in art, began when man 
was not yet an erotic being. We do not know who, 25,000 years BCE, 
formed a figurine of a woman out of soft limestone, today called the Ve­
nus of Willendorf (Austria); we do not know who, probably at the same 
time, but not necessarily in the same place, used a mammoth bone for 
the same purpose, thanks to which we can presently admire the so-called 
Venus of Lespugue (France). There are still more such figurines. They 
present women of -  delicately speaking -  fairly considerable proportions, 
which, at one time at least, were extremely useful for childbearing and 
breast-feeding. We do not know whether the figurines were made by men 
who did not yet suppose that they were fathers of some of the children 
who appeared in the group from time to time. Maybe the figurines were 
made by women who were fully aware that they had at some point given 
birth to some children and so knew very well which aspects of their cor­
poreality were the most crucial. The only virtue of the feminine body was 
fertility -  children were constantly dying and so women constantly had to 
bear them. The people of those times as yet had no need of the love be­
tween a man and a woman. Their mutual submissiveness to their own 
desire was sufficient.
The ancient Greeks and Romans already knew that every child had 
not only a mother but also a father. They also knew that desire did not 
suffice to make the child that was its fruit ‘only theirs’, since ‘only their’ 
child also needed ‘their’ love. Men and women, as represented by art, be­
come more and more individual. Crawling on all fours, we learn to live in 
the world of ‘my’ man and ‘my’ woman. The expectations that form their 
images are no longer those of fertile nature, but rather of desiring na­
ture, since fertility is now supposed to be the natural effect of love, and 
not its cause. Love needs an adequate aesthetic framework. Although it 
can be unpredictable, it is fond of symmetrical and regular shapes. That 
is why women are beautiful and men are handsome.
The Christian Middle Ages seem to be a little bit lost in the world of 
love. Although there is no doubt that it is love that is the highest value, it 
is the religious love for God, and not the sensual love for another person. 
Men and women choose one another only when they cannot live other­
wise: when they are truly spiritually great, they do not need one another. 
So it is no surprise that a man in love appears to be a blind man. Women 
are associated with sin. Love for them is not a source of freedom, but of 
slavery.
Modern art rediscovers the female body. Thanks to art, its image can 
be a fully legal source of aesthetic pleasure. The female nude, that is, the 
female body observed by men, becomes more and more attractive. That is 
why it is beautiful, alluring and -  most importantly -  submissive. Al­
though sensuality is still not legal in official life, in art it experiences 
moments of true greatness and male freedom. It is a male freedom be­
cause only men may look. It is men who paint, sculpt and desire women. 
Women, meanwhile, must always have closed eyes. Although they submit 
to male desires, they themselves should be free from desire. We still live 
in a world where women have passive bodies and men have active souls. 
Only art -  coyly at first, then with increasing impudence -  reminds us 
that the female body also has the courage to want. Plato’s philosophical 
man was truly alive as long as he experienced being; the religious man of 
Augustine lived to the full as long as he loved God. The modern man, 
meanwhile, reduces the lofty and solemn experience of existence to the 
mathematic and philosophical taming of the universe; the louder he de­
clares his love of God, the more he believes in himself and is attached to 
his desires and needs. Modernity ennobles sensuality, especially when it 
succeeds in overcoming its obviousness. This occurs in art, science and 
life. The ambition of the natural sciences, which are based on experience, 
is to fulfil themselves in the physical arms of the world; love is only true 
when it has the courage to fulfil itself in a physical relation with another 
person. Both the limbs’ of the body of the world and the ‘limbs’ of another 
person’s body appear to be the only object of legally valid and sensible 
desire. The objective discourse of science and the objective discourse of 
love co-create the discourse of modern life, previously only foretold by art. 
Man -  both he who experiences and he who loves -  lives, not in the 
world, but in its image, of which he is the divine creator. Real is not that 
which is rational; real is that which can love and be loved.
It is not only science and art that ennoble the ‘limbs of the body’. Sen­
suality unfolds its spiritual character also in love. The more a work of art 
exposes its corporeality, the more it refuses to be reduced to the body. In 
the world of art, the nudity of a work of art -  as well as the nudity of the 
body in the world of love -  is a source, not of shame, but of hope, dignity 
and greatness. A work of art invites the beholder to sensual contact, 
which opens the mind of man to values for which there is no longer room 
in any sensuality. The expansion of the philosophy of art to philosophy 
tout court is an ambitious attempt to indicate a new place for sensuality
in the axiological space of human life. This expansion, initiated by Kant, 
developed by Hegel and, in a more explicit form, Schelling, will find its 
full development in Nietzsche. Not only is it solely in a work of art that 
man can fully recognise himself, but also this recognition is a source of 
legal delight. Thus the aesthetic and at the same time sensual pleasure 
offered to man by the body of a work of art is the only legal delight in 
early modernity of which philosophy (aesthetics) is prone to absolve him 
and which he can anticipate and even desire without any detriment to 
his humanity. In late modernity, it will turn out that nudity (the con­
sciousness of which appeared together with the experience of what is 
good and bad), hitherto permitted in the doctor’s surgery, representing 
the dignity of science, and on a painting, representing the dignity of art, 
is not only permitted but also prescribed (thanks largely to the unmask­
ing proposed by psychoanalysis) in the moments of a ‘love embrace’. Al­
though modern man was falling asleep in the world of delights legiti­
mised by art, he wakes up in a world of delights validated by life.
There is a shortage of forbidden fruits of the existence of which art 
could remind us. The nudity of a man and a woman has become legal, 
love is legal, both men and women talk about their sexual dilemmas and 
desires. Eros is allowed to do everything, and perhaps that is why Eros 
wants less and less. Sensuality is everywhere; but as it gives freedom to 
everybody, in actual fact it gives it to nobody. What does it matter that 
everybody is a soloist, if everybody sings the same and in the same way? 
Once again, art accurately senses the signs of the times. Modern artists, 
as well as their mediaeval ancestors, warn us against the greed of our 
sensuality. They rarely display shapely, well-proportioned and alluring 
bodies. They rather take delight in disease, deformity and unshapeliness. 
Both female and male bodies boast of their defectiveness. On the one 
hand, women do not want to submit to men; on the other hand, there are 
no men who would deserve to be called a conqueror. Everybody loves, and 
that is why nobody loves anyone. The modern art of love is not fine art. It 
warns against love more than it incites us to it. It is art that arouses 
anxiety. The love that emerges from it does not procreate life, but carries 
on beside it.
Translated by Barbara Komorowska
